In the history of United States foreign policymaking, the most tense and perhaps most consequential period came in the wake of the second world war. Following the invasion of Berlin in April 1945, Stalin and the Soviet Union proceeded to conquer much of Eastern Europe; along with a new dominant power came a dominating political ideology. By 1947, the communist ideology had spread throughout much of Eastern and Western Europe. In describing the political climate of the time, and in hindsight the era to come, Churchill stated “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an “Iron Curtain” has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow.”
In the context of US-Soviet relations, the path to polarization preceded Churchill’s comments. During the summer of 1945, George Keenan, US Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow, found himself returning to his post in the USSR. In being highly critical of the Soviet Union, Keenan found himself at odds with the US State Department, which took an attitude of friendship with the USSR considering their alliance during WWII. In the winter of the following year however, the US Treasury questioned why the Soviets did not support the newly established World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Subsequently, the US Embassy in Moscow was tasked with developing an answer. In response, Keenan drafted the “Long Telegram.”
In its preface is the following:
“Answer to Dept’s 284, Feb 3 involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into a single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts.”
After reviewing the five parts to the 8000 part telegraph, it is evident that according to Keenan, the USSR did not see the possibility for a peaceful coexistence with the capitalist ideology. By the summer of 1946, President Truman, frustrated by Soviet actions, sought to dig deeper. In this, Clark Clifford, senior advisor to Truman, along with Naval commander and presidential advisor George Elsey, set out to analyze Keenan’s memorandum and translate it into policy recommendations. The final report, which held input from high ranking officials in the Department of State in addition to the expertise of Keenan, encompassed background on US-Soviet wartime relations, Soviet violations of agreements, and insight into existing agreements.
It should be noted that the Clifford-Elsey Report, was presented solely to President Truman on September 24, 1946 and remained top secret and uncirculated until 1968.
Considering the approach taken by the United States in dealing with the USSR, polarization was just a matter of time; the policymaking to come would affect the lives of many individuals not only abroad, but on the home front as well.
The International Review 